analysis has been conducted regarding the inverse relationship. Thus, the aim of this study is to estimate the tributary income losses that low levels of competition in the retail petrol market could cause in it, using for this aim the data from Canary Islands Autonomous Community. Firstly, we will use Parker and Röller´s methodology (1997) to measure the level of competition and confirm a deficiency. Then, using estimated rates, we will determine the differences that would appear in tributary income if the market were to behave as a Cournot´s model. Our results show that the lack of competition causes a substantial loss of tributary income for this region, somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of the real income from the tax on unleaded petrol for the year 2004.
Introduction
The existence of market competition directly affects not only the consumers and the operating companies, but also a third economic agent: the State. This fact indirectly affects public income as well since the greater the competition level, the greater the quantity exchanged, according to the different market structures. The result is greater economic activity, and thus, more income from direct taxes, indirect taxes, etc.
This phenomenon is especially relevant within the hydrocarbon market.
The multiple uses and high consumption of petrol products emphasise the importance of this sector in any economy, both publicly and privately. Over the last two decades, the petrol tax has increased, signifying a large amount of income for the State (and Autonomous Communities in Spain).
All areas of this sector in Spain have undergone considerable change during the last two decades 3 , having progressed from a public monopoly to complete liberalisation, excluding the pipeline transport network, which is still somewhat regulated. This restructuring can be divided into three stages (Comisión Nacional de la Energía, 2003) . The first stage lasted until 1984 and featured a high level of state market intervention and thus, a public petrol monopoly. The liberalisation process began in the second stage, which occurred between 1984 and 1992. The objectives during this time were to abolish the public monopoly, moving from the regulation of administrative prices to a regulation of maximum prices, and to partially privatise Repsol, the public company operating in this sector. Finally, 1992 marked the beginning of the third stage, when the liberalisation process intensified. The most significant progress included the deregulation of maximum 3 For a discussion of this process see Bel (2002) . prices, introducing a free market pricing system; the elimination of a minimum distance between petrol stations; and complete privatisation of Repsol. As a result, the Spanish petrol market is one of the most liberalised markets, and one which experienced a relatively shorter deregulation period.
Despite this transition, Spanish market structure has not changed significantly.
It still has a high concentration of wholesale production (in 2002, Repsol's refinement capacity comprised 61 percent of Spain's total capacity), with a similar situation in the retail sector, despite an increase in points of sale derived from the removal of certain opening requirements 4 (in 2002, the 3-firm concentration ratio ( 3 CR ), with regards to the number of retail points of sale, was 72 percent, according to the Enciclopedia del petróleo, petroquímica y gas, 2002).
Market concentration can result in less competition among companies, especially when the end consumer is located in a geographically limited area, as is the case with the Canary Islands. According to Gal (2003) , there are three possible effects on competition and companies in smaller markets: natural monopoly behaviours, dominant firms and oligopolistic conduct. The first does in effect take place in this market, whereas the other two, which are interrelated, shall be analysed in the first objective of this study.
However, this sector's structure is not the only element that has undergone significant change over the last two years. Tax policies related to hydrocarbon consumption have also changed substantially. A series of tax reforms has sparked a gradual increase in petrol taxation on the Spanish mainland (although Spain still has the lowest petrol taxes in Europe) as well as the introduction of a special tax for the Canary Islands Community. As we will see in section 3, this tax is an Considering this situation, this study will be conducted as follows. We begin with two reviews: one on the main theoretical and empirical studies that show a link between fiscal policies and the petrol market; and one on the most important contributions in the competition analysis of this sector (section 2). We then reveal the main characteristics of the Canary Islands' hydrocarbon market from two different perspectives: tax and petrol market data (section 3). In section 4, we present the empirical model used to confirm competition in the retail petrol market, allowing us to estimate the level of competition in section 5. In section 6, we show what effects this behaviour may have on the region's tributary income and section 7 summarises the conclusions of this report.
Literature and theoretical framework
Studies that link tributary income with the petrol market revolve around two issues: on the one hand, the effects that changes in petrol taxation have on collection, prices and social welfare; and on the other, the ability of petrol taxes to internalise the negative external consequences of its consumption (mainly pollution).
A good example of the first approach is the study by Uri and Boyd (1998) . By implementing a model of general equilibrium consisting of 14 production sectors and 14 consumer sectors, they evaluate how a change in petrol and gas oil taxation would affect the United States' economy. One of the limitations of these calculations is that they assumed elasticity-price of the demand is zero. The study concludes that a tax decrease would bring about a higher output level, an increase 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 In turn, Besley and Rosen (1998) , analyse the possible interrelation between state and federal taxes. By using an estimate through least ordinary squares and focusing on the petrol and cigarettes taxes, the authors conclude that when the federal government increases taxes, states respond by raising theirs in turn.
Likewise, the authors find empirical evidence that states with larger petrol and cigarettes output have fewer taxes on these goods, which they feel is indicative of political pressure from business lobbies.
At a local level, Hawkins and Wallace (2006) analyze what are the effects of changes in the demographics for a taxing jurisdiction. Using household data and focusing on some commodities (including motor fuel), they argue that "(…) An exemption for food at home provides relatively less relief for working households and relatively more for retired and transfer-pay-reliant households while a decrease in the rate on motor fuel is more beneficial for the same working constituents". For this reason, they conclude that commodity tax policies have to establish relative group priorities when evaluating tax changes. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , these authors find that: first, the less elastic the demand, the higher the tax regression; and second, the use of petrol tax increases to finance a decrease in labour taxes makes the policy less regressive, despite the fact that using fiscal income to finance fixed taxes actually makes it progressive.
As regards the Spanish market, Asensio, Matas and Raymond (2003) establish the progressive nature of taxing petrol, although from a certain income level, this tax becomes regressive again.
In summary, all studies that link the petrol market with tributary income primarily focus on the general regressive nature of the tax on its consumers (although it depends on income level and elasticity of demand), as well as on its efficiency as an internalising mechanism of external environmental effects generated by hydrocarbon consumption. Second, our study analyses the previously-unstudied Canary Islands market, therefore giving us two advantages when measuring its market competition: a less restrictive assumption when defining the relevant geographic market, and the simultaneous existence of both monopoly and oligopoly markets. Thus, we are able to compare our method's correct specification in order to measure the degree of competition.
In order to conduct our study, we must determine whether the companies' behaviour is competitive. A recurring study within Industrial Economy has focused on the existence of competition, or lack thereof, in different markets.
Precisely within the petrol market, Slade (1986) rejects the hypothesis of fixedprice competition for the Vancouver retail market. The same author (1987 and 1992 ) also concludes that petrol prices for Vancouver behave according to a tacit collusion dynamic. This balance is altered by periods of price wars brought about by shocks in demand. Borenstein (1991) , Shepard (1991) , and Borenstein and Shepard (1996) , obtain very similar results for the North American market.
In reference to Spain, the first results along this line of analysis are those described by Perdiguero (2006) . He analyses the possible strategic performance in price fixing by companies via a dynamic model. The result shows empirical evidence of collusive prices in the petrol market. In this article, we will estimate the level of competition in the Canary Islands petrol market through the methodology proposed by Parker and Röller (1997) .
Section 4 will discuss the findings further.
The Canary Islands petrol market
There are two main differences between the petrol markets of the Canary Islands and of Spanish mainland: the market structure and the tax system.
As opposed to the Spanish mainland, the Canary Islands market was not a public monopoly that was later privatised. In fact, the company CEPSA owned the first Spanish refinery funded by private capital, which was set up on Tenerife
Island in 1930. It wasn't until twenty years later that a second refinery was created on national territory. Thus, private companies sprung up that, although they could not refine petrol themselves, they could still serve the market with supplies from the aforementioned refinery.
Taking into account the performance of hydrocarbon prices in the public sector, this behaviour has been (and still is) absolutely inferior to that registered in Spanish mainland's service stations. This is due to the implementation of a tax on "fuels derived from petrol", which is only in effect in the Canary Islands. This is a single-phase tax applied to wholesale transactions, which is restricted by the regulation not to be above 75 percent of those applied on the Spanish mainland and in the Balearic Islands. 5 Table 1 summarises the type of duty applied until now, depending on the product.
INSERT Gomera and El Hierro, a fact that shall be used to contrast the competition model proposed in section 4 and to obtain two functions of petrol demand, depending on whether they are islands with a monopoly (La Gomera and El Hierro) or islands with more than one operator (the rest of the islands).
Considering this information, it seems the Canary Islands petrol market structure offers conditions conducive to low competition behaviour. This study aims to measure competition via the conjectural variation methodology, which, if we achieve a non-competitive result, will estimate the amount that the Canary Islands Treasury did not obtain in 2004. This calculation will be carried out with our model's estimated rates.
We will concentrate on the data used for the empirical application. This information dates between September 2003 and December 2004 (inclusive) . All data is organised by month (except population) and island. The varying quantity is 
Tacit collusion: an empirical application
One of the initial aims of this study is to econometrically calculate a model that will gather together the behaviour of Canary Islands petrol market companies.
However, the specific market characteristics affect the creation of this model. First, the analysis will be carried out as an average of each Archipelago island, without trying to determine results of a Hottelling localisation problem; second, and derived from the previous point, companies compete in a relevant geographic market (the island market) to increase their market quota; third, the product is considered homogenous.
Parker and Röller´s (1997) proposal was used to develop the conjectural variations methodology, for measuring tacit collusion, or its absence, in the Canary Islands hydrocarbon retail market. More recently, Perdiguero (2006a and 2006b) , who developed the model in more detail, applied it in this very same market. For its empirical application, we conduct the analysis in two cases with different structures: the La Gomera and El Hierro islands, where DISA has a monopoly; and the rest of the islands, where the competition is intra-island and carried out amongst the companies in the market. The existence of this single proponent on both islands allows this data to be used in a model specification comparison. We must note a lack of broader information, which forces us to estimate an average behaviour parameter on the islands with an oligopoly, instead of one per island.
In order to empirically implement the theoretical model described previously, we will use the following linear demand function 6 :
( ) The solution to the problem involves a total estimate of the demand equation and the balance equation. To achieve this, we use a system of simultaneous equations through non-linear three least squares.
Results
The estimate of the specified model has been carried out in two phases. In the first, we calculate the performance of El Hierro and La Gomera, where DISA has a monopoly. In this case, as we can see in Table 2 , the conduct parameter for the islands with a monopoly confirms this fact ( 0.99 = ). In this case, the coefficient that accompanies the price is -3.87; with a significance of 6 percent.
INSERT TABLE 2
Once the monopolised market have been analysed, we must do the same with the remaining five islands to determine the type of competition of each. Table 3 depicts the results obtained from the islands with an oligopoly. The rate accompanying the quantity is less than in the case of the monopoly. Its significance is 1 percent.
INSERT TABLE 3
On these islands, the conduct parameter is an average of 0.81. The econometric results obtained do not allow us to reject the possibility that this parameter may be a Cournot-style outcome ( )
, as is the case of a perfect collusion ( ) 1 = , although it is closer to a collusive balance than a Cournot equilibrium. For both estimates, the chi-squared test guarantees the overall model identification.
As far as the variable consisting of the population plus the number of passengers per airplane, we must conclude it is not significant in any case. The fact that the population varies little over the period analysed (this data is annual), coupled with the seasonal nature of tourism, causes the possible effect of this variable on prices to be grouped with the place and time "dummies" which we included in the model specification and estimate. However, the variable of the price of refined petrol in the Rotterdam market, plus the transport cost shows in all cases the sign that we expected, and its significance is 1 percent.
A priori, companies in each market (island) may behave differently. To prove this, we have carried out the preceding estimates from the differentiated model on the two islands with the highest petrol consumption (Gran Canaria and Tenerife) and the other oligopoly islands (Lanzarote, Fuerteventura and La Palma). Tables 4 and 5 depict these results. The conduct parameter does not vary much between these two island groups, nor amongst the group of oligopoly islands (compare with Table 3 ), although a lack of data provides less precise results.
In summary, our data shows that the company behaviour on islands with more than one petrol company seems to be more collusive than the Cournot-style competition outcome. However we cannot flat out declare the existence of a perfect collusion performance.
Despite being different markets, time periods and geographic areas, the results are similar to those obtained by Parker and Röller (1997) and Duso (2005) for the mobile telephone market, as well as to Fageda's (2006) evaluation for the Spanish air market. The same methodology was used in all these studies. The parallelism of these results may be explained by the fact that all of these cases involve concentrated network industries. 
Fiscal effects of the level of competition
Having analysed the degree of competition and determined a degree of collusion greater than in a Cournot equilibrium, we shall assess whether this lack of competition in the oligopoly islands affects the Autonomous Community's income.
To achieve this, the first step is to calculate the average demand elasticity both in the monopoly and oligopoly markets. In our case, the demand price elasticity will be determined by the following formula: is obtained from equation (2), and its value is the estimated coefficient 1 ; m Q and m p , are the average quantities and prices, respectively.
With this formula, the results obtained are -0.76 for monopolies and -1.7 for the oligopoly islands. Supposing a linear demand, economic theory has proven that, if companies operate as a monopoly, demand elasticity should be equal to (if 0 MC = ) or greater than 1 . In our case, the estimated elasticity is coherent with economic theory. The elasticity is somewhat greater than those obtained by other studies that exclusively analyse petrol demand, as seen in Table 6 .
INSERT TABLE 6
The fact that we presuppose a linear demand explains the high elasticity we find in our study. In his meta-analysis, Espey (1998) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w With this data, and having determined that the degree of tacit collusion in the market sets the stage for price reductions, we simulate their decrease and consequences on the autonomy's income through the wholesale hydrocarbon tax.
Specifically, using estimated coefficients for the demand and equilibrium equations, we will estimate the prices that may be obtained in the market if the conduct parameter were at the value predetermined by a Cournot level of competition.
From equilibrium equation (3), we predetermined ts Q coefficient, i.e. As may be obvious, prices would decrease if competition increased. This reduction would provoke an increase in petrol consumption. This is in line with a tax collection increase on petrol-related products, in this case unleaded petrol (see Table 1 ). Table 7 demonstrates the loss of income the Canary Islands administration would have suffered in 2004 in the oligopoly islands (which consume more petrol).
INSERT TABLE 7
As we can see in the preceding table, in 2004 the Canary Islands Community lost almost one hundred million euros, amounting to about 39.1 percent of the total fiscal income derived from hydrocarbon taxation. This percentage increases to 58.1 percent if we only consider the unleaded petrol tax, which is the object of our analysis. This result is not final, since the aim of the proposed model is not to estimate the function of petrol demand, but to derive it from the overall approximation of the equations that explain company performance in this market. Thus, the estimated elasticity value is far greater (for oligopoly islands) than that revealed by economic literature regarding the estimation of functions of hydrocarbon demand predicted at the retail level.
However, Table 8 shows how much income each island's Autonomous Community is losing, estimating different values of demand elasticity instead of using our model's demand characteristic. As we can see, the losses in fiscal income are significant.
INSERT TABLE 8
The loss of income varies between 1.86 and 9.28 percent of the total income from taxes on hydrocarbons if we use an elasticity of between -0.1 and -0.5 respectively. In absolute terms for the year 2004, it varies between 4.7 and 23.5 million euros, hardly a negligible sum for an Autonomous Community.
The percentage of relative losses increases if we consider the quantity collected by the Administration through unleaded petrol stations: within the range of 2.76 and 13.79 percent of the total, with conditioned elasticity.
Conclusions
There are three reasons that the petrol market is crucial to any economy: first, small consumers' intense demand for this type of product: second, it is a raw material for a large number of industries; third, because the tax system deems them an important source of income for any administration. This study has two interrelated objectives within the framework of this sector:
on one hand, to measure the existence of collusion (or lack thereof) in the Canary
Islands retail petrol market, and on the other, to evaluate how sector competition affects the Autonomous Community's tributary income.
Our study is unique for various reasons. First, the causal link of our analysis is contrary to that applied in previous studies. We do not look at the effect taxes have on company and consumer behaviour. Rather, we measure the behaviours' effect on tributary income.
Additionally, our study focuses on the Canary Islands, a market which has not been previously studied. We offer two innovative advantages in the measurement of competition levels: greater ease in defining relevant geographic markets and the simultaneous presence of monopoly and oligopoly markets.
For the first objective, and in order to understand retail companies' behaviour in the Canary Islands market, we have followed Parker and Röller's (1997) method and, more recently, Jiménez and Perdiguero (2006b) , for this same market.
The latter is based on the estimation of companies' performance parameter in the presence of variations in the quantities offered by other companies. This means each company's objective should be to increase its market quota on each island.
Our study does not create a model or a potential vertical integration between refinery and distributor, or the possible Hottelling horizontal competition.
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